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I believe that the sort of disagreements we encounter in philosophy—disagreements that often 
take the form that I have elsewhere called systematic peer disagreements—make it unreasonable 
to think that there is any knowledge, or even justified belief, when the disagreements themselves 
are systematic. I readily acknowledge that this skeptical view is quite controversial; I suspect 
many are unconvinced.2 However, I will not be defending it here. Rather, I will be exploring a 
worry, or set of worries, that arise on the assumption that this view is correct. For if it is 
unreasonable to think that there is justified belief in contexts of systematic philosophical 
disagreements, by what right do we continue to advance philosophical claims in such contexts? 
                                                             
1 I have benefitted in recent years from may profitable discussions of the matters I discuss in this paper; 
for these I thank Hilary Kornblith, Jennifer Lackey, Nick Leonard, Peter Ludlow, Baron Reed, Tim 
Sundell, and Sarah Wright.  I want to give thanks as well to audiences at Oxford University and the 
Kentucky Philosophical Association 2011 meeting, where I have presented parts of this paper in talks.  
Finally, I want to express a very special thanks to Diego Machuca, for his very helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
2 As Baron Reed and Nick Leonard have pointed out to me, there appears to be an air of self-defeatingness 
in this: if the truth of my claim, to the effect that it is unreasonable to think that there is knowledge or 
justified belief on matters of systematic disagreement, is itself a matter of systematic disagreement, then 
even if my claim is true it is neither known or justifiably believed. I have come to think that this is grist for 
the mill of the Pyrrhonian skeptic. Nevertheless, I will not be developing this idea here. 
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Indeed, by what right do we believe the philosophical claims we advance? And if we don’t 
believe them, why do we advance them in the first place? An inability to respond to these worries 
would leave us with the distinct impression that the practice or activity of philosophy is quite 
suspect: what sort of practice or activity would have us believe unreasonably, assert 
unwarrantedly, and perhaps exhibit insincerity to boot? 
 In this paper I want to address these worries. I want to do so, first, by being clear on 
precisely what does follow (regarding the doxastic and assertoric elements in philosophical 
practice) from my skeptical view; and second, by arguing that, far from constituting a reductio, 
the implications of my skeptical view are in fact independently defensible. In particular, these 
implications can be used to shed light on the doxastic attitudes that are present in the activity of 
philosophizing, and on the normative dimension of that part of the activity of philosophy wherein 
we make and respond to claims. 
To this end, I will be advancing three hypotheses in conjunction with a picture of 
philosophical practice. The hypotheses are these. First, while an attitude of belief is unreasonable 
in the face of systematic disagreement, nevertheless there is a doxastic attitude that is reasonable 
even under such conditions: the attitude of regarding-as-defensible. Second, while philosophical 
assertions under conditions of systematic disagreement fail to conform to a norm of justified 
belief (let alone knowledge), philosophical assertions need not be unwarranted for all that. Third, 
and relatedly, it is not the case that a philosopher is insincere whenever she makes a philosophical 
assertion whose content she does not believe. On the contrary, there is a kind of sincerity that 
goes along with what I will call the activity of defending a philosophical view. When conditions 
are mutually acknowledged to involve systematic disagreement, one who defends a philosophical 
view warrants her audience to have certain expectations regarding her attitude towards the view 
she is defending; as a result, she can misrepresent herself as having that attitude when in fact she 
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does not. Sincerity in connection with the defense of a philosophical view, then, is simply a 
matter of having the attitude in question (regarding-as-defensible). Insofar as this sort of picture 
is mutually familiar to those engaged in the practice of philosophy, none of the parties to a 
philosophical discussion should be misled into regarding each other as believing the views for 
which they are arguing; as a result, none should be inclined to level a charge of insincerity merely 
because of a failure by one’s interlocutor to believe her own views. Such, anyway, are the views I 
will be defending here.  
 
2.  Systematic peer disagreements and the case for skepticism  
 
The picture I will be developing, and to some extent defending, is a radical one. I endorse it in 
part because I think there is no choice, once one comes to see the strength of the case for 
skepticism regarding philosophical knowledge and justified belief. But since the resulting picture 
is radical, it will be helpful to begin with a quick review of the case for skepticism—if only to 
suggest why one might think that there is no alternative. Since I have defended this sort of 
skepticism elsewhere,3 here I will be quick.  
 My argument for the skeptical conclusion just described employs the notion of a 
systematic peer disagreement. A systematic peer disagreement is a species of peer disagreement, 
that is, a disagreement between people who regard themselves as roughly equivalent in 
intellectual competence and in familiarity with the evidence bearing on the question before them.  
A peer disagreement is systematic when it is non-local, widespread, and entrenched. A peer 
                                                             
3 See Goldberg (2009; 2012).  In Goldberg 2009 I resisted the conclusion of the argument I presented; in 
Goldberg 2012 I drew the conclusion of the argument; but in both cases I presented an argument for a 
certain kind of skepticism, arising from the facts regarding philosophical disagreement. 
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disagreement over whether p is non-local when the disagreement over whether p is part of a 
much wider disagreement, with lots of other related matters in dispute. Thus, non-local 
disagreements contrast with the class of disagreements which Elga (2007) and Kornblith (2010) 
label “isolated disagreement,” where the disagreement does not “threaten to force [participants] 
to suspend judgment very widely.” (Kornblith 2010, 33) A peer disagreement is widespread 
when at least two of the positions endorsed by the disagreeing parties have attracted, or are 
capable of attracting, a substantial and dedicated following. Thus it is not just a disagreement 
between two people, but between two (or more) groups of people, each of which is to some 
degree committed to its claims in the face of the disagreement. Finally, a peer disagreement is 
entrenched when it has persisted for at least some time, with both sides continuing to defend and 
advance their side, in the face of persistent challenges from the other side, where the defenses in 
question remain responsive to the relevant evidence and arguments.  
 With this as the relevant understanding of a systematic peer disagreement, I then went on 
to offer an argument for skepticism on matters of philosophical controversy. My case begins with 
the following MASTER ARGUMENT, which has nothing in particular to do with philosophy per 
se: 
 
I. In cases in which S believes that p in the face of a systematic peer disagreement over whether p, 
there are (undefeated doxastic or normative) defeaters with respect to S’s belief that p. 
II. If there are (undefeated doxastic or normative) defeaters with respect to S’s belief that p, then S 
neither knows, nor is doxastically justified in believing, that p. 
Therefore, 
III. If p is a proposition regarding which there is systematic peer disagreement, then if S believes that 
p, S’s belief is neither knowledgeable nor doxastically justified. 
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I then went on to argue that many cases of philosophical disagreement are cases of systematic 
peer disagreement. The result is that no belief under these conditions is knowledgeable or 
doxastically justified. 
 As I have formulated it here, the conclusion of the foregoing argument is a strong 
skeptical conclusion: no knowledge or doxastically justified belief is available in contexts of 
systematic peer disagreement. As I will indicate below, however, it is possible to tweak the 
premises of this argument so that it supports a weaker conclusion: it is unreasonable to suppose 
that knowledge or doxastically justified belief is available in contexts of systematic peer 
disagreement. In what follows, I will distinguish these conclusions, if only to suggest which 
conclusion(s) are needed to develop the difficulty introduced at the outset of this paper. 
 
3. Unhappy implications of philosophical skepticism? 
 
Let a ‘contested proposition’ be any proposition p regarding which there is systematic 
disagreement in philosophy. As just noted, the argument above might be used to establish one or 
both of two skeptical conclusions. The weaker skeptical conclusion is this: 
 
Weak Philosophical Skepticism (WPS) 
It is unreasonable to think that belief in a contested proposition is knowledgeable or even 
doxastically justified. 
 
The stronger skeptical conclusion that might be supported by the foregoing argument is this:  
 
Strong Philosophical Skepticism (SPS) 
There is no knowledge of or justified belief in any contested proposition. 
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In what follows I want to bring out how these views threaten to undermine the possibility of 
reasonable belief in, and warranted or sincere claims advancing, contested propositions.  
 It is perhaps easiest to appreciate how the weaker conclusion of MASTER ARGUMENT 
threatens the possibility of reasonable belief in contested propositions. To this end consider the 
following argument, which I will call ‘NO REASONABLE BELIEF’: 
 
i. It is not reasonable to believe that p if it is unreasonable to believe that such a belief is justified. 
[Plausible thesis about epistemic defeat] 
ii. For any contested proposition p, it unreasonable to believe that the belief that p is justified. [WPS] 
Therefore, 
iii. It is not reasonable to believe any contested proposition, that is, any proposition on matters 
regarding which there is systematic disagreement in philosophy. [From (i) and (ii)] 
 
In this manner the lesson of NO REASONABLE BELIEF is clear: WPS plus a plausible account 
of epistemic defeat yield the skeptical conclusion that there is no reasonable belief on 
controversial matters of philosophy. 
Next, consider how the stronger conclusion of MASTER ARGUMENT jeopardizes the 
possibility of warranted claims advancing contested propositions. This objection is based on the 
following mini-argument, which I will call ‘UNWARRANTED CLAIMS’: 
 
1. To advance a claim is to make an assertion. [Plausible characterization of ‘advancing a claim’] 
2. For any speaker S and assertion that p, S’s assertion is warranted only if: S justifiably believes 
that p. [Implication of any one in a range of widely-endorsed theses regarding the norm of 
assertion4] 
                                                             
4 If knowledge that p entails justifiedly believing that p, as seems imminently plausible, then premise 2 is 
implied by the knowledge norm of assertion—perhaps the most widely-endorsed account of the norm of 
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3. There is no justified belief on matters regarding which there is systematic disagreement in 
philosophy. [SPS] 
Therefore, 
4. To advance a claim on matters regarding which there is systematic disagreement in philosophy is 
unwarranted. 
 
The lesson of UNWARRANTED CLAIMS, then, is that when added to plausible claims about 
the nature of assertion, SPS implies that there is no warranted assertion of a contested 
proposition. 
 Finally, consider the case for thinking that the weaker conclusion of MASTER 
ARGUMENT jeopardizes the possibility of (reasonable people making) sincere claims advancing 
contested propositions. Consider the following argument which I will call ‘INSINCERE 
CLAIMS’: 
 
a. It is not reasonable to believe contested propositions. [Conclusion of NO REASONABLE 
BELIEF] 
b. Assume that S’s beliefs are reasonable. [Assumption] 
c. Then S does not believe contested propositions. [Trivial implication from (a) and (b)] 
d. Assume S makes a claim advancing a contested proposition. [Assumption] 
e. Then S does not believe the proposition advanced in the claim. [Trivial implication from (c) and 
(d)] 
f. If S makes a claim but does not believe the proposition advanced in the claim, then S is insincere. 
[Plausible characterization of ‘insincerity’] 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
assertion. (The knowledge norm is defended in Unger (1975), DeRose (1996), Williamson (1996), 
Hawthorne (2005), and Stanley (2005), among others.) But premise 2 is also implied by “rational 
credibility” norms of the sort endorsed by Douven (2006), Lackey (2007), and Kvanvig (2009). 
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Therefore 
g. If S’s beliefs are reasonable yet S makes a claim advancing a contested proposition, then S is 
insincere. [From (e) and (f)] 
 
Since (g) itself is implicitly general, it holds of any subject S, and hence we have the lesson of 
INSINCERE CLAIMS: no reasonable person—no person whose beliefs are reasonable— 
sincerely makes a claim advancing a contested proposition. By implication, if S is a reasonable 
person who makes a claim advancing a contested proposition, S is being insincere. 
 In this way we see that the combination of Weak Philosophical Skepticism (WPS) and 
Strong Philosophical Skepticism (SPS) appear to undermine the possibility of reasonable belief 
in, and warranted and sincere assertion of, contested propositions. If such a result is left to stand, 
it would arguably make a mockery of philosophical practice. (“Arguably,” since it is arguable 
that philosophical practice depends on the possibility of warranted and sincere claims advancing 
contested propositions.) Those who do not doubt the viability of philosophical practice will take 
our result as a reason to reject both WPS and SPS. Since I am assuming the cogency of MASTER 
ARGUMENT, and so am assuming that the case for both WPS and SPS is solid, I am assuming 
that such a reaction is wrongheaded. However, in what follows I want to argue that the move to 
preserve philosophical practice by rejecting WPS and SPS is (not merely wrongheaded but) 
unnecessary. Granted that the combination of WPS and SPS does undermine the possibility of 
reasonable belief in contested propositions, I will argue that, even so, this combination is 
compatible with cases of warranted and sincere assertion of such propositions. To show this, I 
will begin by considering what sort of attitude other than belief might be reasonably instantiated 
by those with controversial philosophical ‘views’. I will then go on to use this proposal to 
characterize conditions on warranted and sincere assertion of contested propositions. 
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4.  Defending a philosophical position 
 
Let us accept (if only for the sake of argument) the following conclusion of NO REASONABLE 
BELIEF: it is not reasonable to believe propositions on matters regarding which there is 
systematic disagreement in philosophy. If this is correct, then any belief in a contested 
proposition is unreasonable. Unless we want to condemn philosophers to widespread 
unreasonableness (!), we must allow that their doxastic attitude towards contested propositions is, 
or at any rate can be, something other than that of belief. But once we have agreed that belief in 
contested propositions is unreasonable, we immediately face the question whether there is a 
doxastic attitude which it would be reasonable to have towards such propositions. I want to 
answer this question in the affirmative; the attitude in question is that of regarding-as-defensible. 
In this section I develop this idea. 
 It will help to begin with a few uncontroversial comments about the nature of belief.5 It is 
normatively inappropriate for a subject S to take an attitude of belief towards the proposition that 
p if S believes that the balance of evidence favors the hypothesis that not-p. Stronger still: taking 
an attitude of belief towards [p] is normatively inappropriate if S believes that the balance of 
evidence does not strongly support either that p, or that not-p. And even more strongly still: 
taking an attitude of belief towards [p] is normatively inappropriate if, given the state of the 
evidence, S should believe that the balance of evidence does not strongly support either that p, or 
that not-p. I take all of this as obvious. 
                                                             
5 Since I will be using “belief” in these comments, they are not intended as analyses of “belief,” but rather 
as truisms to help us fix the attitude in question. 
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Next, consider what is involved in holding a philosophical view under conditions of 
(acknowledged) systematic disagreement—something familiar to all of us. Let Jones be such a 
philosopher. If she is reasonable, Jones will recognize that the arguments on her side are not 
decisive; she will recognize that there are arguments on the other side that she is not in a position 
to refute. To be sure, she will regard the weight of the considerations supporting the opposition to 
be less than the weight of the considerations supporting her own view: if not, she is unreasonable 
in holding on to her view. But at the same time, she will acknowledge that her opponents do not 
agree with her on her weighting of the evidence. So even as Jones continues to hold on to and 
argue for her views in the face of this disagreement, she will acknowledge—or at any rate, she 
ought to acknowledge—that there are others who are equally smart, equally knowledgeable of the 
arguments and evidence, equally attentive and motivated to get things right, and who would be 
highly motivated to discern their errors if they could, who nevertheless failed to do so, even 
having given the matter a good deal of their time and effort. But more than this: Jones will 
acknowledge—or at any rate she ought to acknowledge—that it is not only in the present case, 
but in the entire history of the dispute, that those who are in the wrong have not been brought to 
see the error(s) of their ways, despite the best efforts of those on the side of truth (as she sees it). 
And this conclusion, in turn, should tell Jones something about the discernibility of the sort(s) of 
truth and falsity that are at issue here. Even as she continues to endorse and defend her views, and 
so even as she continues to think that she has the truth on her side, still, given the persisting 
systematic disagreement, she must acknowledge that truth and falsity here are not easily 
discernible by very many people as smart as she is, as knowledgeable of the relevant arguments 
and evidence, who have had a good deal of time thinking about the relevant issues, who work in a 
manner that is at least somewhat independent of others, who are as highly motivated to endorse 
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what is true as she is, etc. In these circumstances, I submit, she should not be particularly 
confident that she does have the truth on her side. 
Suppose that this is so: when Jones holds views under conditions in which she 
acknowledges that there is systematic (peer) disagreement, Jones ought not to be particularly 
confident of the truth of her views. Then it seems to me that to precisely this degree her situation 
is like that of someone who regards the evidence bearing on whether p to be such as not to 
decisively tell in favor of either [p] or its negation. This is not to say that she regards it as an open 
question which side is better supported; to repeat, if that were her attitude, she shouldn’t have 
views on the matter at all.6 Rather, my claim is that her views on the second-order question—
which side is better supported by the total evidence?—do not have the sort of confidence that 
goes along with the attitude of belief. And if this is so, then Jones ought not to believe that p: 
such an attitude would be normatively inappropriate given the evidence.  
 Perhaps it will be wondered how it can be reasonable for one to continue to “have a 
view” on a matter regarding which one acknowledges that the total evidence does not warrant 
                                                             
6 I am not sure this is correct. Mightn’t I defend a view which I regard as a “long shot,” even as I 
acknowledge that it is less well-supported by current evidence than is one of its competitors? Would this 
alone convict me of unreasonableness or irrationality? I don’t think so. It seems to me that the decision to 
defend a view on a controversial matter in philosophy is as much a normative status—I thereby inherit the 
burden of defending it, that is, of providing positive reasons on its behalf, and fending off objections from 
other parties—as it is a judgment made on the basis of evidence. To be sure, if I don’t think that it will 
turn out that the view I favor will ultimately be better-supported by the evidence—perhaps by evidence to 
which no one currently has access, or by reasons which no one has thought of to date—then there seems 
something slightly perverse about my defending that view. In any case I leave these details for future 
work. 
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belief in either the hypothesis that p or its negation. But it is easy to see that these worries are 
misguided. Consider the attitude of speculation. (Or, if one thinks that speculation is a speech act, 
not an attitude, consider the attitude-type that constitutes the sincerity condition for this speech 
act.  Call this “attitudinal speculation.”)  It is consistent with one’s (attitudinally) speculating that 
p that one acknowledges that the total set of reasons and evidence bearing on whether p fail to 
warrant belief either way. To be sure, one who speculates that p will regard the balance of 
reasons as tipping in favor of the truth of [p], as against its negation.7 Still, such a person might 
happily concede that this balance in favor of [p] is not sufficiently strong as to warrant outright 
belief in [p]. Hence the attitude of speculation that p: one who attitudinally speculates that p 
regards [p] as more likely than [not-p], though also regards the total evidence as stopping short of 
warranting belief in [p]. It should be obvious that one’s attitude on this score can be more or less 
reasonable: it is more reasonable to the degree that the evidential situation is as one takes it to be, 
namely, such as to make it more likely that [p], even as the evidence stops short of being 
supportive enough to warrant outright belief in [p]. What this shows is that there is a truth-
directed attitude which can be reasonable even in the face of evidence which one acknowledges 
to fall short of warranting outright belief. The objection that there can be no such attitude, then, is 
met. 
 Still, it might be wondered whether the sort of attitude I am describing—an attitude in the 
family of attitudinal speculation—is anything like the attitude of those who have views on 
contested matters in philosophy.  Many will object straight-away that they believe their theories, 
                                                             
7 We might then construe attitudinal speculation as a matter of having a degree of belief that is above .5 
but which is below the threshold for outright belief. I am sympathetic to this construal, but do not have the 
space to argue for it here.  
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period; to such folks, any attempt to characterize their attitude as other than belief is to be false to 
the facts.8  However, my claims here are that they shouldn’t believe, and that in any case there is 
an attitudinal cousin of belief which is reasonable to have even under conditions of systematic 
disagreement and which captures much, if perhaps not all, of the things that are involved in 
“having a view” in philosophy.   
To make good on this claim, I need to revisit what is involved in “having a view” in 
philosophy. Typically, the attitude present when one “has a view” in philosophy involves 
endorsing the view, and also being committed to defending it (as the occasion arises). This, I 
want to suggest, is the core of the attitude associated with having a view in philosophy: it is to 
regard the view as defensible. The attitude of regarding a view as defensible stretches a long way 
across a confidence interval. At one extreme, S regards a view as defensible when S regards it as 
true (perhaps because she has what she regards as decisive evidence in favor of the view). At the 
other extreme, S regards a view as defensible when, although S acknowledges that the reasons 
and evidence bearing on the question do not settle matters, and so do not warrant outright belief, 
still, the balance of reasons supports [p] over [not-p].9 (There are cases between these extremes as 
well, of course.) One might take the latter sort of attitude in the face of acknowledged systematic 
disagreement. It is when one does so, I submit, that one’s doxastic attitude should be seen as a 
species of (attitudinal) speculation—at least with respect to one’s assessment of the evidential 
situation. 
Still, there are some important differences between attitudinal speculation (simpliciter, as 
it were) and the attitude that corresponds to the endorsement and defense of a philosophical view 
                                                             
8 I thank Diego Machuca for this point. 
9 But see n. 5 for a potentially very important qualification. 
 14 
(when this is done under conditions of systematic disagreement). One who endorses and defends 
a philosophical view is typically more motivated to persist in defense of the view when 
challenged, than is one who merely speculates that p. (We are more committed, and perhaps more 
emotionally attached, to our philosophical views, than we are to our speculations.) I grant this, 
but deny that it establishes anything very substantial. For even granting the point, it might only 
suggest that endorsing and defending a view under conditions of systematic disagreement is a 
special case of attitudinal speculation—one whose specialness consists (in part) of characteristic 
emotional overtones and the associated practical commitments. What is more, it is not hard to see 
how a species of attitudinal speculation with this sort of emotional-and-practical-commitment 
profile might emerge. If one takes oneself to have a deep appreciation of the total evidence 
bearing on the question on which one is speculating, one might well feel motivated to defend 
one’s speculation against those who would speculate that the contrary is true. What is more, there 
is also a sociological dimension to philosophical practice in this regard: since it is common 
knowledge that those who defend their views well do better in the profession, generally speaking, 
one will have a clear motive (and emotional investment) in defending one’s views in philosophy. 
Finally, there is also a psychological dimension to philosophical practice in this regard: since 
many of the views we defend are views about such things as the nature of the good life, or justice, 
or beauty, or what is of ultimate value, etc., and since such matters are the sort of things around 
which one can orient one’s life, one will be animated to defend these views when they are put 
under pressure. In short, we have many motives for being emotionally involved in, and motivated 
to defend, our philosophical views; and we can make sense of these motives even on the 
assumption that having a philosophical view on a contested issue is a species of attitudinal 
speculation. 
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There is one other aspect of philosophical practice that becomes intelligible on the 
hypothesis that having a philosophical view on a controversial topic is a matter of attitudinal 
speculation: we can make sense of the possibility of (cases of) “reasonable disagreement in 
philosophy.” If having a view is a matter of attitudinal speculation, and if attitudinal speculation 
is a matter of having a degree of confidence above .5 but below the threshold warranting outright 
belief, then disagreements over the truth-value of a given proposition can be formulated as 
disagreements over the point within the confidence interval between disbelief and belief which 
the total evidence warrants. But as the disagreeing sides get closer and closer to one another—
one side a bit above .5, the other side a bit below .5—it becomes harder and harder to discern 
from the total evidence which side is correct. In this way we might be able to make sense of 
reasonable disagreement regarding contested propositions, even if we assume that for any body 
of evidence and any proposition there is a unique degree of confidence one ought to have in that 
proposition given that evidence.10 In the same way that it can be very hard for anyone to discern 
whether the total evidence warrants a degree of confidence in [p] which is .9, as opposed to .89 or 
.88 or …, so too it can be very hard to discern whether the total evidence warrants a .55 degree of 
confidence in [p], as opposed to .45 (or some other close value less than .5). Even if the 
uniqueness thesis is true, we can in this way still make sense of the reasonableness of (some) 
philosophical disagreements. Note though that if the uniqueness thesis is true, and if having a 
view in philosophy involves having an outright belief in the truth of the view, reasonable 
disagreement in philosophy is a non-starter. In that case the disagreement is one in which the 
confidence levels of the disputing parties are at a great distance from one another, and so the 
                                                             
10 This is of course one version of the uniqueness thesis, familiar in debates in the epistemology of 
disagreement. 
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disagreement over whether p cannot be rationalized as a matter of the difficulty of discerning 
where within some small interval the evidence warrants. 
 In sum: I tentatively endorse the hypothesis that, when one defends a view in the face of 
acknowledged systematic disagreement, one’s attitude is—or should be!—a species of attitudinal 
speculation as to the truth of the view. The advantage of such a proposal is that it enables us to 
see how one’s attitude can continue to be reasonable, even when one acknowledges (as one 
should) that the state of evidence fails to warrant outright belief on either side.11 Of course, no 
sooner is this hypothesis formulated than we face the other set of worries noted at the outset of 
this paper, namely: if one doesn’t flat-out believe one’s views, by what right does one assert them 
(in conversation with other philosophers)? And can one’s doing so ever be anything other than a 
case of insincerity? 
 
5.  Reconceiving philosophical practice: a Grice-inspired account 
 
In what follows, I want to try to address both of these problems—unwarrantedness and 
insincerity in philosophical assertions—at once. I do so by way of an account of assertion that 
can make sense of warranted, sincere assertions of contested propositions in philosophy. That it 
can do so is a selling point of the account; but I will begin by motivating the account using 
considerations having nothing specifically to do with these problems—if only to make clear that 
the appeal to such an account need not be ad hoc. (Alas, considerations of space prevent a full 
development of these ideas here.12) 
                                                             
11 It also promises to enable us to see how certain cases of reasonable disagreement in philosophy are 
possible. 
12 I do so in Goldberg (n.d.). 
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 An account of assertion is an account of a type of speech act, and as such it should be 
presented against the background of our best understanding of speech acts. Paul Grice (1968/89) 
has provided an important grounding principle for such an understanding. Regarding speech as a 
rational, cooperative activity, Grice formulated the familiar Cooperative Principle as capturing a 
core part of the rationality of particular acts of this sort: 
 
Cooperative Principle (CP) 
Make your contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted 
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice 1968/89, 26) 
 
Now most people who have employed Grice’s CP (and the account he developed on this basis) 
have done so out of an interest in offering an account of how speakers manage to communicate 
more than they (strictly and literally) say, and of how hearers manage to recover what is 
communicated when this goes beyond what is (strictly and literally) said. That is to say, most 
people using CP do so with an eye on characterizing the content dimension of communication. 
But I see no reason why we can’t use Grice’s insight to shed light on the dimension of 
(illocutionary) force.  
In this light, it is worth underscoring that Grice went on to present various submaxims 
that he regarded as falling out of CP. Of these I highlight one (which he called Quality): 
 
Quality (Q)  
Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
(Grice 1968/89, 27) 
 
While Grice’s submaxims are aimed at characterizing the notion of “saying” something, I think it 
is not a far stretch to regard Q itself as contributing to our understanding of the speech act of 
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assertion as well. On this picture, the speech act of assertion is governed by two rules: you 
shouldn’t assert what you believe to be false, and you shouldn’t assert that for which you lack 
adequate evidence. But precisely what counts as “adequate” evidence?  
 I think we should answer this question by appeal to the CP itself: the standards for 
adequacy of evidence are determined, at least in part, by “the accepted purpose or direction of the 
talk exchange in which you are engaged.” What is more, I submit that we can spell this out in 
terms of Bach and Harnisch’s useful (1979) notion of mutual belief. The following is their gloss 
on the role that mutual belief plays in the sort of inferences that are made in the course of the 
production and comprehension of speech: 
 
Mutual Belief 
If p is mutually believed between S and H, then (1) not only do S and H believe p, but (2) each 
believes that the other takes it into account in his thinking, and (3) each, supposing the other to 
take p into account, supposes the other to take him to take it into account. (Bach & Harnisch 1979, 
6) 
 
If there is mutual belief that the hearer faces a practical task in which she is in need of 
information, and that she is relying on the speaker to provide this information, then adequate 
evidence would be the sort of evidence for a proposition which would render it reasonable for the 
hearer to act on the assumption that the proposition is true. If there is mutual belief to the effect 
that the hearer needs information of which she can be certain, then adequate evidence would be 
the sort of evidence that would support certainty. Or—to take the case before us—if there is 
mutual belief to the effect that the purpose or direction of the talk exchange is philosophical, then 
evidence is adequate when it satisfies the sorts of standards that people expect of one another in 
the context of doing this sort of philosophy.  
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 What sort of evidence do we expect of one another when engaging in philosophy? It is not 
clear that there is one set standard for all of philosophy. On the contrary, it seems plausible to 
suppose that the expected standard can vary according to subject-matter: what we expect from a 
speaker who is advancing what she presents to be a theorem in logic is one thing, what we expect 
from a speaker who is advancing a claim in ethics (for example) is another still. I submit that this 
is because of what it is reasonable to assume is mutually believed in philosophy. It is reasonable 
to assume mutual belief among philosophers to the effect that propositions in logic can be 
established or refuted by proof. This is why we will expect one advancing such a claim by way of 
a straight assertion to have evidence that approximates a proof. It is also reasonable to assume 
mutual belief among philosophers to the effect that propositions in ethics cannot (typically) be 
established in this way. This is why we will not expect anything approximating a proof of 
someone advancing a claim in ethics. Rather, what we will expect in the way of evidence in 
ethics turns on what is mutually believed, or perhaps what it is reasonable to assume is mutually 
believed, regarding the nature of the subject-matter in ethics: the sorts of considerations that can 
support such claims, the difficulty of synthesizing all of the considerations bearing on a given 
ethical question, the nature of the sorts of methods we use in doing so, and so forth. If it is 
mutually believed that a certain claim in ethics is part of a systematic disagreement, participants 
to the speech exchange will—or at any rate, should—adjust their evidence-related expectations 
accordingly. And what goes for contested ethical propositions, goes more generally for contested 
philosophical propositions—at least insofar as the participants to an exchange in which such 
propositions are being asserted and denied have the sort of mutual belief I have described. 
 The model I am offering here is a special case of a more general picture of speech having 
nothing in particular to do with philosophy (or with disagreement, for that matter). On this 
picture, speech is a cooperative activity, and assertion is to be understood in these terms, as 
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governed by rules of the sort Grice articulated in his principle of Quality. Insofar as these rules 
are themselves an object of (perhaps merely implicit) mutual belief, they determine a set of 
mutual expectations of speaker and hearer. That these expectations are (in part) epistemic, 
demanding adequacy of evidence, is precisely what makes assertion apt for playing the very 
important role it does: that of serving as the vehicle for the transmission of information. For 
consider that a hearer who observes an assertion, and for whom the governing rules are objects of 
mutual belief, will expect that the speaker acknowledges these rules, and so will expect the 
speaker to acknowledge the responsibility for having had adequate evidence.13 Insofar as the 
hearer regards the speaker as having succeeded at following the rules, then, the hearer regards the 
speaker as having adequate evidence; and when the hearer’s so regarding the speaker is rational, 
it is this that rationalizes the hearer’s move to accept the information presented in the assertion, 
on the basis of the fact that it has been so asserted.14 In sum, it is because of the rules governing 
assertion that this speech act is apt for rationalizing hearers beliefs in what is asserted—and 
precisely this renders assertion apt for the transmission of information. 
                                                             
13 We can break this down further. The hearer will regard the speaker as recognizing that she (the speaker) 
has done something impermissible unless she has adequate evidence. Since the hearer regards the speaker 
as recognizing this, and recognizing that the he (the hearer) recognizes it as well, the hearer will regard the 
speaker as having done something which (she acknowledges) all parties will regard as impermissible 
unless she has adequate evidence. On this basis, the hearer will regard the speaker as acknowledging 
responsibility for having had adequate evidence. 
14 Of course, if the hearer was irrational in regarding the speaker as having conformed to the rules—the 
speaker asserted something regarding which it is common knowledge that no one has any evidence, or she 
had obvious vested interests in getting the hearer to believe what she said, etc.—then the hearer’s 
acceptance is itself rationally flawed. 
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 Philosophical claims can be seen as a special case of this general picture. The specialness 
of the case of philosophy can be understood in terms of the distinctive contents regarding which 
(it is reasonable to assume that) there is mutual belief among philosophers. This mass of mutual 
belief serves to adjust the mutual (speech-act-related) expectations we have of one another. In 
this respect, though, philosophers are no different from any other group whose information-
sharing practices are mutually familiar to the members of the group. To repeat, what is distinctive 
of philosophy is the content of our mutual expectations. In particular, I submit that when it is 
mutually believed that we continue to (want to) philosophize in an area despite the persisting 
systematic disagreement in that area, this mutual belief will inform what we expect of those who 
advance claims in the area. Thus, whereas I expect you to know whereof you speak when, 
recognizing that I need directions, you assert that the Empire State Building is at the corner of 
34th St. and 5th Ave., I do not hold you to knowledge when you advance a claim as part of an 
argument on a controversial matter in philosophy. It is not that I let you get away with anything; 
it is rather that what I expect of you differs. I expect that you will have some sort of support on 
behalf of your claim, which support makes a case for the truth of the proposition in question; and 
I expect that you can defend your claim against the various objections that are leveled against it, 
or alternatively that you can give reasons for thinking that the objections in question should not 
lead us to abandon your view. In short, I expect that you can defend the proposition to acceptable 
philosophical standards. Or rather: I will regard your assertion as unwarranted if you cannot so 
defend your claim.  
 We have now come full circle: we can now address the worries regarding the 
warrantedness and sincerity of philosophical claims when they are made under conditions of 
systematic disagreement. My reply will now be apparent. When the speaker S and hearer H 
recognize that they are competent philosophers, there is a mass of mutual belief between them 
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regarding the subject-matter of philosophy, the activity of philosophizing, the difficulty of 
reaching epistemically high-grade belief on the matter, and so forth. This mass of mutual belief 
will help to determine what S and H expect of one another in their philosophical exchanges. In 
particular, H’s expectations will be informed by his (mutual-belief-informed) sense of what it is 
reasonable to expect of someone participating in a systematic philosophical disagreement. And so 
while H will not expect outright belief (let alone knowledge) on S’s part, H will expect that S 
regards her view as defensible, and is committed to defending it. What is more, H’s expectations 
will reflect what he takes to be mutual belief regarding the sort of thing that can reasonably be 
expected of those who endorse and defend a view in philosophy. 
 The foregoing picture can now be used to offer an account of the warrant and sincerity of 
assertions advancing contested propositions. 
Consider first the matter of warrant. This is determined here, as elsewhere, by the 
adequacy of the evidence. The adequacy of the evidence is determined, in accord with CP, by the 
accepted purpose of the talk exchange. My proposal is that it is determined by what (it would be 
reasonable to suppose) is mutually believed. Further, when the participants are philosophers who 
are philosophizing in a domain of systematic disagreement, (what it would be reasonable to 
suppose is) mutual belief will include information regarding the sorts of consideration on which 
these matters turn, the tools available for addressing them, and the difficulties in arriving at 
knowledge and justified belief on the matter. With this as part of what is mutually believed, when 
participants nevertheless continue to want to debate the matter—when they do not conclude that 
further talk exchange would be pointless—they will then adjust their (speech-act-related) 
expectations accordingly. And these adjusted expectations then set the standard for warranted 
philosophical assertion; the demand is for meeting a standard of philosophical defensibility 
(rather than justification or knowledge). 
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If this is so, then we can diagnose the error of UNWARRANTED CLAIMS. In particular, 
premise (2), to the effect that 
 
(2) For any speaker S and assertion that p, S’s assertion is warranted only if: S justifiably 
believes that p. 
 
should be rejected. Below I will suggest that the model of assertion on offer can reject (2) while 
at the same time accommodating the case to be made for the various candidate norms of assertion 
which have (2) as an implication. (The result is that the proposed model does not suffer from 
untoward liberality in the verdicts it sanctions.) 
Note that if the foregoing account of the conditions on warranted assertion of contested 
propositions is correct, we have an account of sincerity in philosophical assertion as well. In 
particular, sincerity is a matter of having the attitude corresponding to what is expected of one 
who is participating in this sort of activity. That is, a sincere assertion of a contested 
philosophical proposition is a matter of regarding the proposition as defensible (and being 
committed to defending it). Since mutual belief among philosophers includes beliefs regarding 
how difficult it is in this domain to arrive at a belief that is doxastically justified, let alone 
knowledgeable, hearers will not in general expect that speakers believe what they say—with the 
further result that mere lack of belief does not constitute insincerity. Insincerity is a matter of 
advancing a claim under conditions in which one does not regard it as defensible (or where one is 
not committed to defending it). 
If this is correct, then we have a diagnosis of where INSINCERE CLAIMS goes wrong. 
In particular, premise (f), to the effect that  
 
 24 
(f) If S makes a claim but does not believe the proposition advanced in the claim, then S is 
insincere. 
 
is false. In general, sincerity in a speech act is a matter of having the attitude which one’s speech 
act warrants the hearer in regarding one as having. But I have argued that when philosophers 
make claims in contexts of systematic disagreement, a hearer is warranted in regarding the 
speaker only as taking the content to be defensible, and as being committed to defending it. 
Indeed, below I will suggest that the foregoing model can explain why one might think (f) is true. 
 It is perhaps worth concluding this section by highlighting one further virtue of the 
general account I am offering. There has been widespread debate on the so-called “norm of 
assertion.” Those who participate in this debate typically regard assertion as a speech act which is 
uniquely governed by a particular rule, where an act’s susceptibility to being assessed by 
reference to that rule is what makes the act one of assertion. The leading candidate for the rule (or 
“norm”) of assertion is knowledge. On this view, one should not assert that p unless one knows 
that p; to assert that p when one does not know that p is to assert unwarrantedly. Now I will not 
rehearse the sorts of argument made on behalf of this candidate norm of assertion, other than to 
say I find many of those arguments compelling. What I do want to say is that the general account 
I am offering, while it is indeed inconsistent with the knowledge rule, nevertheless preserves a 
good deal of what makes the knowledge account so attractive—and in so doing it can explain 
why we might be tempted to endorse claims like (2) and (f) above.  
 We can bring this out as follows. Having endorsed the Gricean claim that one should not 
assert that for which one lacks adequate evidence, I have suggested that adequacy of evidence 
ought to be determined in conjunction with the “purpose of the talk exchange” itself. One way to 
understand this is that speakers ought to make their contributions ones that are helpful to their 
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audience. Insofar as the audience’s needs and assumptions are matters of mutual belief between 
speaker and hearer, these needs and assumptions help to determine both what information would 
be helpful to the hearer, and what sort of evidence would be needed to warrant an assertion of the 
relevant content. But insofar as mutual belief is minimal, the speaker will not be in a position to 
tell either what information would be useful to the hearer, nor what the hearer wants to do with it. 
In such circumstances (of minimal mutual belief), there is upward pressure on the norm of 
assertion. This is for the simple reason that, in these circumstances, the speaker will have to make 
assertions which are such that, no matter the hearer’s informational needs, the contribution is 
helpful to her. But this means that the speech contribution will have to be helpful even if the 
hearer’s needs require a high epistemic standard to be met. Under these conditions, knowledge 
would appear to be required. In this way we can see that the general account I am offering has the 
resources to accept that (and to explain why) knowledge is the norm’s “default setting”—its 
setting when what is mutually believed is not robust enough to adjust the standard in any 
particular way. The account thus can claim to capture much of what motivates the knowledge 
norm, and can indeed accept knowledge as the relevant standard in many, perhaps even most, 
contexts. But the account can also explain why one might find (f) attractive: assuming knowledge 
implies belief, the result is that, given that knowledge is the default norm of assertion (and holds 
in the absence of mutual belief that would adjust the norm), an assertion made under conditions 
of minimal mutual belief—that is, made in ordinary circumstances—is unwarranted if the subject 
does not believe what she asserts. But this scenario, though ordinary enough, should not be taken 
to be the model for all assertion. Philosophical assertion of contested propositions is a case in 
point. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
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In this paper I have responded to a worry, or bundle of worries, that appear to threaten the sort of 
philosophical skepticism I (and others)15 have defended elsewhere. The worry was that, if 
doxastically justified belief and knowledge are not, in general, available on matters of 
philosophical controversy, then it seems that none of us should believe our own views in 
philosophy (when these are matters of systematic disagreement). Further, it seems then that 
neither warranted nor sincere assertion of the content of one’s views is possible. In reaction to 
this, I have allowed that flat-out belief is inappropriate when it comes to contested philosophical 
propositions. But I have argued, first, that there is an attitude towards such propositions that can 
be more or less reasonable in the face of systematic disagreement; second, that such an attitude 
does appear to be the sort of attitude it is rational to have towards one’s own view when one 
recognizes the systematic disagreement; and third, that it is in terms of this attitude that we can 
capture the assertoric practices that make up the activity of philosophizing. What is more, doing 
so is not ad hoc, but instead appears to be motivated by taking a thoroughgoingly Gricean 
attitude towards assertoric force. Far from being objectionable, then, the implications of the sort 
of philosophical skepticism I have defended elsewhere go some distance towards illuminating the 
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